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allows revealing the interaction of gnoseological and ontological principles of his system, e.g. 
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Introduction
Among the host of Russian philosophers, Nikolay Onufrievich Lossky (1870-1965) is 
notable for his striving for systematising of his ideas. Three basic components of his system – 
gnoseology, ontology, and ethics – represent themselves a firmly made construction, which 
took quite a long time to be built. Vasiliy Zenkovskiy, however, points out that although 
Nikolay Lossky was probably the only Russian philosopher, who had constructed a system 
of philosophy in the precise meaning of the term, his system was a combination of internally 
various ideas and principles, an organic synthesis of which he did not wholly succeed to achieve 
[see Zenkovskiy, 1991: 205, 207]. Although, it should be acknowledged that Lossky constructs 
all the components of his system basing upon one and the same primary intuition. Moreover, for 
Lossky himself, the notion of organic synthesis (or, to be more precise, of organic worldview) 
has always been of primordial importance, and his cosmological constructs are no exception.
Nikolay Lossky’s cosmology stirs up certain interest of contemporary philosophers 
and scientists. Alexandr Spaskov and Olesya Kozyna, for instance, believe that the notion 
of substantival agents’ union, developed by Lossky, is “a good expression of the idea of 
universal substantival connection, which is fundamental for the universal unity and diversity” 
[Spaskov & Kozyna, 2016: 130]. Nikolay Lossky’s conception is represented as one of the 
leading constructions of Russian organicism [Masloboyeva, 2011]. Another testimony of 
certain scholarly interest to Nikolay Lossky’s personality became a conference held in 2016 
in Drohobych, Ukraine [Vozniak, 2016]. On the other hand, it would be not untrue to say that 
the philosophical system of Nikolay Lossky still has not been sufficiently examined, nor has its 
value been fully reckoned.
The Types of Worldview: Organic and Non-Organic
In 1931, Lossky proposed his own classification of philosophical worldviews. Having 
rejected the common understanding of the pair “materialism / idealism,” Lossky constructs 
a more sophisticated scheme for correlation of various metaphysical systems, depending 
upon their relation to the ideal (super-time and super-space) and the real (space-and-time) 
being. He discriminates the substantialism (recognising the ideal being only as a substance); 
the ideal-realism (recognising the ideal being as in a form of substances that is the concrete-
ideal being, so in the form of relations, order, form, etc. that is the abstract-ideal being); 
and actualism (rejecting completely the idea of substance, and developing a doctrine of the 
world as a timely process). Moreover, in each of these three metaphysical positions Lossky 
distinguishes yet one more prevailing partition that finally turns to be the key one: the 
fundamental partition between organic and non-organic worldviews.
This distinction, according to Lossky, consists in different understanding of relation 
between the world’s whole, on the one hand, and its parts and elements, on the other. Non-
organic worldview states, therefore, that “elements are something principal, basic, as the 
whole is something secondary, derivative, having emerged of elements. The elements, then, 
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are considered to be something independent, which is fully (or, at least, in compare to the 
whole) irrelative; the whole – on the contrary is fully dependent on its elements, existing 
only in relation to them” [Lossky, 1931: 17]. In its turn, the organic worldview states that the 
whole is rather more primary (of course not in a chronological sense) than its elements, the 
whole is basic as the elements are derivative [Lossky, 1931: 18]. Such a distinction between 
the non-organic and organic worldview Lossky makes (referring to particular cases from the 
history of philosophy upon which we shall not pause here) in substantialism and actualism; 
what about the ideal-realism, there, according to him, should rather be said about the degree 
of development of organic worldview, and in this sense the concrete ideal-realism (unto 
which he says he belongs himself to) should be preferred rather than the abstract ideal-
realism [see Lossky, 1931: 21].
The “concreteness” of Lossky’s ideal-realism becomes evident, first of all, in his vision of 
the basic structure of the world: he believes it consists in hierarchical correlations of organic 
wholes of various level and order. Considering the interest taken by representatives of both 
social and natural sciences in “units of the higher order of life,” he writes that philosophy 
“for a long time has already been developing conceptions on the world’s structure according 
to which every single organism is an element of a something else, more complex organic 
whole, which, in its own turn, is a part of a higher living unit, and so on up to the world’s 
whole, which is the all-embracing, universal living being” [Lossky, 1928b: 11]. Among his 
forerunners, in this respect, Lossky lists Aristotle, Plato, Giordano Bruno, Leibnitz, Gustav 
Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, Eduard Hartman, William Stern.
The Intuitionism and the Organic View of the World
Philosophical way of Nikolay Lossky himself began with psychology and gnoseology. 
Alternatively, to be more precise, it began with his primary philosophical intuition: “everything 
is immanent to everything.” It seems significant that the intuition emerged – as Lossky tells 
himself in his Vospominaniia (Memories) [Lossky, 2008: 93–94], – as a result of – which 
might appear – a natural phenomenon: a thick fog. It is clear that there had rather “worked” 
an active intention to finding the way how to break the epistemological deadlock, created by 
the contraposition of the subject and the object of knowledge. Later Lossky wrote, “…the new 
philosophical science gnoseology (the theory of knowledge)” was in the second half of the 
nineteenth century “the major obstacle to building a harmonious and solid worldview” [Lossky, 
1991a: 339]. Saying this, he had in mind, first of all, the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge. 
His own discovery, which had given a powerful spur to the Obosnovanie Intuitivisma [Lossky, 
1919], Lossky, certainly, believed to be a completely new approach to the subject.
Lossky’s intuitionism should not be confused with, for instance, the one of Henry 
Bergson. His gnoseological conception bases on a few statements, which we apparently shall 
not find in Bergson. Lossky’s intuitionism has founded on idea that the object of knowledge 
is immanent to the process of knowing. The considered object is in the world of not-I, but 
the consideration is a part of the sphere of I. The object is transcendent to the knowing I, 
but immanent to the process of knowing. Intuition, therefore, “does not mean in my system 
the irrationality of contemplated (Bergsonian intuition),” – it means “immediate vision, 
immediate contemplation of the object by the knowing subject” [Lossky, 1995: 137]. “What 
is present in knowledge is not a copy, symbol, or appearance of the thing that is to be known, 
but the thing as it really exists” [Lossky, 1919: 82].
Meanwhile, in Bergson, according to Lossky, intuition loses its meaning of a 
gnoseological tool, which should correlate anyhow with rational knowledge: it has primarily 
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been conditioned by Bergsonian anti-substantialism (or anti-Platonism). Many a time Lossky 
draws the line of demarcation between his own understanding of intuition and the Bergsonian 
one. He emphasised, in particular, that Bergson “did not regard all cognitive acts as intuitive.” 
For Bergson, the same as for Kant, “scientific knowledge expressible in rational concepts 
was for him a subjective construct of our reason and not contemplation of reality” [Lossky, 
1952: 703]. For Lossky himself intuition – as a grasp of the object of knowledge in the 
original – means, per se, any cognitive act, which may differ merely in respect of awareness 
and recognition, dividing into sensible, intellectual, and mystical intuition.
Contemplation of other entities such as they are in themselves is possible because the 
world is a definite organic whole, as the knowing subject is a super-temporal and super-spatial 
being, closely connected with all the world. External objects coordinate with the knowing 
personality in their wholeness and in all the endless plurality of their content (Lossky calls 
it “epistemological coordination,” i.e. “a peculiar non-causal relation between the conscious 
subject and the object of which he is conscious” [Lossky, 1928a: 10]), but all the diversity 
connects with a human I but subconsciously. We know (recognise) only those facets of an 
object, which are of interest to us.
In time, Lossky arrived to a conclusion that the pure gnoseological substantiation 
of intuitionism was insufficient. As a result, there appeared an ontologico-cosmological 
substantiation of the system: a book titled Mir kak orhanicheskoe tseloe (The World as an 
Organic Whole).1 In his future works, Lossky has developed this substantiation in a number 
of respects: ontological axiology, ontological ethics, theodicy, ontological aesthetics, and 
the doctrine of reincarnation. The gnoseological component of his system also got its future 
development. However, fundamentally, Lossky did not revise his views anymore.
The Hierarchy of Substantival Agents
Nikolay Lossky is usually ranked among Russian neo-Leibnizians. Indeed, being 
influenced by Alexey Kozlov’s panpsychism, he refers to Leibnizian theory of monads – 
the units of being, created by the Absolute (God). Lossky’s monads, however, interact with 
each other; in contrast with the ones of Leibniz, the monads of Lossky do have windows 
and, moreover, their true essence is clearly manifested in the active interpenetration and 
mutual commitment. Such an ontological viewpoint Simon Frank suggests that it should be 
called a personalist philosophy of community: “His personalism opposes any individualism; 
personality from the very beginning grows on free community and love, and in them only it 
embodies itself” [Frank, 1936: 634].
Nikolay Lossky constructs his representation of the world as a set of super-spatial, super-
temporal, and metapsychophysical entities – the substantival agents of various level of 
development. Substantival agents – even the elementary ones are free and relatively self-
sufficient beings. Lossky distinguishes five kinds of substantival agents: pre-biological, 
biological, social, planetary, and divine or super-biological. The unity of being enables him to 
speak about forerunners of moral behaviour in the pre-human nature. He shares, in particular, 
Peter Kropotkin’s idea that the common support, and not the common struggle for existence, 
is the major factor of evolution. “All the nature is the one organic whole, which is constructed 
hierarchically” [Lossky, 1991b: 82].
1 First the work was published during 1915 in a series of articles in the journal Voprosy filosofii i 
psikhologii; the first Russian edition as a separate book issued in 1917. The first edition of the English 
translation saw the light in 1928 [Lossky, 1928a].
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Lossky, however, emphasised (as if to anticipate famous Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorem) that any system cannot be explained from itself. “<…> where a system is there 
must be something super-systemic” [Lossky, 1991a: 385]. Within the framework of his 
organic worldview, which he also called the absolute philosophical theism, this principle 
meant acknowledgement of the Absolute – i.e. God – as the super-organic beginning. 
Although claiming his theistic position to be rather more consistent than tending to pantheism 
the philosophy of all-unity, Lossky developed quite a specific understanding of the idea of 
creation. 
According to Lossky, the first act of creation is the creation of substantival agents, which 
had been done before the Six days. God, according to Lossky, does not create the world as a 
set of events (such understanding, on his opinion, would lead to pantheism), but as “a set of 
creatures who themselves – independently on God and each other – create events, entering 
into relationships of either love or enmity with each other” [Lossky, 1991b: 53]. However, 
their independence is relative, since they are abstractly-consubstantiate: they are bearers 
of the identical ideal principles of time, space, and other common forms of the world. Here 
reappears the general principle which is basic for both Lossky’s ontology and gnoseology: 
“everything is immanent to everything”. Immanency as interpenetration does not mean 
confounding – if substantival agents are consubstantial in their forms, then, the “content 
of their own actions each agent creates independently by its own individual creative might; 
it can harmonically combine with contents of other beings, but it also can oppose them” 
[Lossky, 1991b: 55].
Substantival agents of any level are successors of God’s work of creation: they are 
creators or co-creators who are evolving themselves (creating their own disposition, making 
their own way), and de facto continue the work of the world’s creation in the whole range 
of events and things (we shall observe that Lossky developed a dynamical conception of 
matter: he did not considered matter as a substantial stuff, but as a result of efforts, first of 
all, a force of repulsion, which creates the relation of impenetrability). Monads, as potential 
personalities, evolve to higher, human forms: thus, along with the conception of creation, 
Lossky introduces the conception of transcreation, i.e. a supplementary creative act of God 
that raises the soul from being a creature to the dignity of human being, making a potential 
personality to become the actual one.
“As bearers of creative powers substantival agents are distinct and independent, but as 
bearers of basic abstractly ideal forms they are identical and form one being; therefore even 
in their independent aspect they are mutually co-ordinated to an extent which ensures the 
possibility of intuition, love, sympathy (in the true sense worked out by Max Scheler), i.e., of 
direct intimate communion” [Lossky, 1951: 255]. Abstract consubstantiality of substantival 
agents is, therefore, a prerequisite of achieving the particular consubstantiality, their catholic 
creativity and entering in the Kingdom of God. There are enmity and rivalry that rule in the 
material world, but the enmity and personal impenetrability that depends upon it are relative. 
A few agents joined together in order to achieve their goals is the way to achieve more 
complex stages of existence – hierarchies of unities (from an atom to the Universe), where 
every subsequent stage is directed by an individual of the higher stage of development.
The Doctrine of Reincarnation
Thus, in this peculiar panvitalistic version of personalism, the central ontological element 
of the world is a substantival agent – or a potency of personality, or an actual personality. At 
the same time, a human being is an aggregate of agents (potential personalities, constituting, 
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for instance, his body) and an independent agent – the human I in this sense does not 
coincide with body or soul of the particular individual, since it is a metapsychophysical 
entity, though it is tightly knit together with its spatial and temporal manifestations: I is not 
mere being, but the being-for-the-self; actions of the I exist for itself as its experience: I is 
immanent to all its manifestations and so tightly knit together with them that they always 
become something super-temporal-temporal and super-spatial-spatial” [Lossky, 1991b: 55]. 
Nevertheless, human I falls into the category of substantival agents, which Lossky calls the 
actual personalities: “The words ‘actual personality’ should signify an entity that is aware 
of absolute values, i.e. the values that have a positive meaning for all, – such values are the 
truth, moral good, freedom, beauty, God” [Lossky, 1994: 323].
Life is a union of agents in existence that submits to a principal agent, who defines the 
goal of the existence (from an atom to the Universe). Precondition for possibility of the union 
is the abstract unity of their essences and particular involvement of inferior beings into the 
higher life, i.e. an effort to attract them to the higher objective values, which are achieved 
by the higher agent. Correspondingly, the death is the corporal break-up of the union: “<…> 
Death is the separation of our I from the union body, but it is not the loss of ability to produce 
spatial acts” [Lossky, 1995: 302]. Individual agents do not die, but continue in reincarnations. 
Death is not the destruction of substantival agent, but only of his body, which is united by that 
union of substantival agents. I itself remains forever, being eternal.
Here we encounter one of the most controversial – at least if you bear in mind his declared 
adherence to Christian teaching – side of Lossky’s philosophical system, and namely his 
doctrine of reincarnation. This doctrine, however, only develops and supplements his 
substantival pluralism and his conception of hierarchical personalism. Being created by God, 
substantival agents are eternal (or, to be more precise, super-temporal), but they are not preset 
or given once and for all. They are full of changes and life; moreover, they are continuously 
interacting, and this interaction brings forth various unions (“union bodies”) of substantival 
agents that, in their turn, are participating in the limited time. A particular human being, per 
se, is a “union body,” in which various (including those that are hierarchically of different 
levels) substantival agents join together for a limited time; this union body, the same as the 
material body in which it is embodied, is corruptible, but the substantival agent, around 
whom it aggregates, is super-temporal, and therefore is able, after “the death of the body,” to 
make a new “union” and to reincarnate becoming a new man.
We might say that the doctrine is a peculiar form of panvitalism – moreover, Lossky 
himself says it: “every agent is a living and animated being” [Lossky, 1992: 25] – but this 
would be an insufficient characteristic. Lossky states an ontological version of personalism; 
activism, intentionality (purposiveness), and creative activity of substantival agents – all 
these are the ontological features of substantive-plural being. Within the framework of this 
system, human being is a very important section, first of all, since a human is not a potential 
but an actual substantival agent, who is a fruit of certain development, evolution (not as much 
in biological sense as in a sense of the development of – created in the beginning – super-
spatial and super-temporal substantival agent). However, a human being as a developed 
substantival agent and a human being as a particular individual are definitely two different 
personalities that exist in different dimensions: the super-spatial and the spatial, the super-
temporal and the temporal.
Lossky’s doctrine of reincarnation has undoubtedly had very intimate and romantic 
nature, for instance, when he is saying: “That, who feels to a person truly individual affection, 
creating with her the indissoluble (ontological) ties of being. After death, in a new incarnation 
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these ties continue to exist, at least in a form of an unaccountable sympathy to the individual 
if there is no remembrance of the past. Moreover, at a higher stage of development, all the 
past stages of life can be called to mind and then there becomes possible the conscious 
communion with the person whom we once loved truly, i.e. with the everlasting love” 
[Lossky, 1992: 69]. However, there can emerge a feeling that in this “everlasting life”, which 
does not know the death of substantival agent who is now and again incarnating in various 
people, there is so little left of the ordinary, earthly, human affection and love.
The World as the Embodiment of Beauty
In Mir kak orhanicheskoe tseloe (The World as an Organic Whole) Nikolay Lossky states 
that the universal (cosmic) order is morally meaningful as the work of Providence. “Thus 
the incorporatedness of each event into the all-embracing world’s union <…> is not a blind 
chance, but contains the deepest meaning, being a matter of moral necessity” [Lossky, 1991a: 
458]. Nevertheless, he rejects the subjectivism of Kant ant neo-Kantians, according to which 
it is namely the activity of transcendental subject that brings the unity and connection into the 
variety of sensual impressions.
Super-temporality of substantival agent defines its freedom of its own past as well as of 
the laws of temporal process. Criticising Bergsonian anti-substantialism, Lossky states that 
the “super-temporal beginning, namely, along with the temporal process make possible the 
continuous regeneration of the real being” [Lossky, 1991a: 551], i.e. super-temporality is only 
the source of creativity and freedom. In a more complex respect, it is said of the freedom of 
substantival agents from the laws of nature. Nikolay Lossky refers here to dynamic understanding 
of matter (“matter is not a substance, but a process”). Distinguishing between the laws of ideal 
forms (e.g. in mathematics) and “the rest of natural laws,” he states that the later “do not have 
absolute power over our behaviour” [Lossky, 1991a: 555]. In his reasoning we may discern 
the logic of Leibniz’s distinction between the Truths of Reasoning and the Truths of Fact [see 
Leibniz 1710: 460], as well as Leibniz’s understanding of nature as “only a custom of God’s” – 
or the notorious laws of nature – “which he can change on the occasion of a stronger reason 
than that which moved him to use these regulations” [Leibniz, 1710: 415]. Lossky distinguishes 
between the law of nature that expresses the necessary connection of events, and a dynamic 
aspect of the law that is created by voluntary activities of substantival agents. This dynamic 
aspect as a “passage from super-quality power to its qualification and manifestation in acting,” 
though being repeated for many a time, can never become an automatic, abstractly defined 
law, since the mode of behaviour set autonomously by a substantival agent can likewise be 
autonomously revoked by the same agent [Lossky, 1991a: 558].
The accomplishment of Lossky’s system of organic worldview may be regarded his book 
Mir kak osuschestvlenie krasoty (The World as an Embodiment of Beauty) that saw the light 
only in 1998. The book is based on a course of lectures he delivered in the late 1940s at Saint 
Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary in New York (in Vospominaniia Lossky says it 
was a course on Christian aesthetics [Lossky, 2008: 262]). In the book Lossky develops his 
conception of the objective being of values, and in the present case – the value of beauty. 
Beauty is an absolute value, i.e. it possesses a positive meaning “for all personalities who are 
able to perceive it.” The unity of absolute values is the perfect beauty containing in itself all 
absolute values, but at the same time it is an independent value that consists in their sensual 
embodiment” [Lossky, 1998: 18–19].
Certainly, absolute beauty is an ideal, accessible only for God-manhood and in God’s 
Kingdom: stating this Lossky remains on the grounds of mystical experience, mystical 
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intuition. On the other hand, the contents of perfect beauty can at least in part and imperfect 
forms be perceived in forms of daily experience, sensual and intellectual intuition. It is said, 
in particular, that beauty “is always spiritual or mental being that is embodied sensually, 
i.e. insolubly knit together with the life of body” [Lossky, 1998: 28]. It should be noticed 
that the word body has in Lossky two meanings: an aggregate of spatial processes of a 
certain substantival agent (i.e. the material body), and a union of substantival agents, united 
under the guidance of a hierarchically higher agent that is the “union body” of which it has 
already been said above. This is, so to say, an “ideal-real” body. Expressions of beauty of 
material body “have value not only in themselves, as life’s blossoming, but also because 
they are expressions of the life of the soul” [Lossky, 1998: 29], and in this sense they are the 
expressions of ideal-real beauty.
The principle of axiological unity – the unity of values – also is manifested in the 
following: Lossky explains the violation and going astray from the beauty in material 
world by deviations of substantive agents from absolute good, from the movement to God, 
and eventually by their self-love. Lossky also argues against the opinion of the majority 
of aestheticians, who “believe that only ‘higher’ sensual qualities, perceived by vision 
and hearing, are important for the object beauty,” he defends the “aesthetic value” also 
of our inferior sensations (taste, smell, etc.), which are too closely connected with our 
biological needs. The earthly beauty in all its manifestations is eventually defined by the 
fact that “soul and spirit are always incarnated; and they become the actual in no other 
way than in particular, singular events, spirit-and-body or soul-and-body” [Lossky, 1998: 
31]. Self-love of substantival agents defines deficiency of the earthly beauty. At the same 
time, Lossky emphasises ontological, metaphysical nature of beauty: “The beauty is the 
objective value that belongs to the most beautiful object; it does not emerge initially in 
psychological experience of a subject at the moment of time when he perceives an object” 
[Lossky, 1998: 44].
Conclusion
Nikolay Lossky’s philosophical system, undoubtedly, can be considered as a cosmological 
one. Ontological understanding of the world as an organic whole intertwines in this system 
with gnoseological immanentism – a specific version of intuitionism and a conception of 
epistemological coordination. The central place in Lossky’s organic worldview belongs to 
the doctrine of substantival agents – super-space and super-time active centres, creating 
the world, per se, in its eventfulness and objectivity. Lossky’s cosmology is explicitly 
religious, though his philosophical theism can hardly remind of any apologetics. Argument 
for the existence of God is constructed as a rational and logical principle: the necessity of 
acknowledgement of a super-system beginning in order to understand any system; in the 
present case – the acknowledgement of the Absolute as the super-organic beginning, necessary 
for understanding of the organic wholeness of the world. The Embodiment of Beauty in the 
world also has religious and metaphysical explanation, based on acknowledgement of the 
ontological nature of absolute values.
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